A complete and strongly anonymous leximin relation on infinite streams by Asheim, Geir Bjarne & Zuber, Stéphane
A complete and strongly anonymous
leximin relation on infinite streams∗
Geir B. Asheima Ste´phane Zuberb
September 12, 2012
Abstract
Various extensions of the leximin order to the infinite dimensional setting
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1 Introduction
Maximin — which is often identified with Rawls’ (1999) ‘difference principle’ and
which in the intergenerational setting is the principle of giving extreme priority
to the generation whose consumption has lowest rank — satisfies procedural
equity: it treats generations equally by not being dependent on the sequence in
which generations appear. However, it is only sensitive to the interests of the
worst off generation.
In order to enhance sensitivity, Sen (1970) suggested maximin in its lexico-
graphic form. This criterion, referred to as leximin, gives extreme priority to
the generation whose consumption has lowest rank, while taking into account a
generation whose consumption has higher rank if and only if there are ties at all
lower ranks. In a finite setting, it is a complete, reflexive and transitive criterion
which satisfies both procedural equity (by being indifferent to all permutations)
and the strong Pareto principle (by being sensitive to each component of the
consumption vector).
However, in a setting where an infinite, but countable, number of gener-
ations follow each other in sequence, it is impossible to combine the strong
Pareto principle with full procedural equity (referred to as the axiom of strong
anonymity), as shown by Van Liedekerke and Lauwers (1997). Moreover, any
explicitly described complete, reflexive and transitive preferences satisfying the
strong Pareto principle cannot even be combined with a weaker form of pro-
cedural equity (referred to as the axiom of finite anonymity) where the social
evaluation is indifferent to only finite permutations; this is the Lauwers-Zame
impossibility result (Lauwers, 2010; Zame, 2007).
To resolve the dilemma that arises due to the Lauwers-Zame impossibility
result, completeness is usually dropped when leximin is extended to an infinite
setting, while observing the strong Pareto principle and indifference to finite
permutations (see Asheim, 2010, Section 4, for an overview of this literature).
An alternative approach to the problem of extending leximin to an infinite
setting is to start with maximin defined by the objective function inft∈Nxt, where
xt is the consumption (indicating the wellbeing) of generation t. Recall that
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maximin is a complete, reflexive and transitive criterion satisfying the axiom
of strong anonymity, even in the infinite setting. One can then ask how much
sensitivity to the interests of any one generation can be introduced without
producing a conflict with completeness and the axiom of strong anonymity. The
present paper shows that the conflict arises only when trying to take into account
generations whose consumption has infinite rank.
In the context of an extreme prioritarian criterion like leximin, one can argue
that the interests of generations whose consumption has infinite rank should
not matter, as for any such generation there are infinitely many generations
that are worse off. Consequently, in the present paper we restrict the domain
of the strong Pareto principle to finitely ranked generations, while retaining
completeness and the axiom of strong anonymity. This produces a complete,
reflexive and transitive leximin criterion which is fully procedurally equitable by
satisfying the axiom of strong anonymity, but which does not take into account
generations whose consumption has infinite rank.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the framework
of our analysis. In Section 3 we define and provide an axiomatic foundation
for the new leximin criterion for infinite consumption streams and discuss its
properties. In Section 4 we show how the proposed leximin criterion is related
to the extended rank-dependent utilitarian criterion recently introduced and
analyzed by Zuber and Asheim (2011). In Section 5 we show how this new
leximin criterion is related to other leximin criteria suggested in the infinite
setting, while in Section 6 we offer concluding remarks.
2 The framework
Let N denote as usual the set of natural numbers {1, 2, 3, . . . }. Let R denote
the set of real numbers, and R+ the set of nonnegative real numbers.
Denote by x = (x1, x2, . . . , xt, . . . ) an infinite stream (or allocation), where
xt ∈ R+ is a one-dimensional indicator of the wellbeing of generation t. We
refer to this indicator as the consumption of generation t, restrict attention to
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allocations consisting of bounded consumption streams, and denote by
X =
{
x = (x1, . . . , xt, . . . ) ∈ RN+ : suptxt < +∞
}
the set of possible allocations.
For x, y ∈ X, write x ≥ y whenever xt ≥ yt for all t ∈ N; write x > y
if x ≥ y and x 6= y; and write x  y whenever xt > yt for all t ∈ N. For
any T ∈ N and x, y ∈ X, denote by xTy the consumption stream z such that
zt = xt for all t ≤ T and zt = yt for all t > T . For any z ∈ R+ and x ∈ X,
denote by (z,x) the stream (z, x1, x2, . . . ).
A permutation pi is a one-to-one map from N onto N. For any x ∈ X
and permutation pi, write xpi = (xpi(1), xpi(2), . . . ) ∈ X. Permutations can be
represented by a permutation matrix, P = (pij)i,j∈N, which is an infinite matrix
satisfying:
(1) For each i ∈ N, pij(i) = 1 for some j(i) ∈ N and pij = 0 for all j 6= j(i).
(2) For each j ∈ N, pi(j)j = 1 for some i(j) ∈ N and pij = 0 for all i 6= i(j).
Given any permutation pi, there is a permutation matrix P such that, for any
x ∈ X, xpi = (xpi(1), xpi(2), . . . ) = Px. Conversely, given any permutation matrix
P , there is a permutation pi defined by pi = Pa, where a = (1, 2, 3, . . . ). The
set of all permutations is denoted by P .
A finite permutation pi is a permutation such that there is T ∈ N with
pi(t) = t for all t > T . Thus, a finite permutation matrix has ptt = 1 for all
t > T for some T ∈ N. The set of all finite permutations is denoted by F .
Given a permutation matrix P ∈ P and T ∈ N, we denote the T × T matrix
(pij)i,j∈{1,...,T} by P (T ). Let
S = {P ∈ P : there is some k ∈ N such that, for each T ∈ N,
P (kT ) is a finite dimensional permutation matrix}
denote the set of fixed-step permutations.
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Two subsets of X will be of particular interest. First, we introduce the set
X+ of non-decreasing streams in X. This set is defined as follows: X+ = {x ∈
X : xt ≤ xt+1,∀t ∈ N}.
The second subset of X, playing a key role in the remainder of the paper, is
the set of allocations, X¯, whose elements can be permuted into non-decreasing
streams. This set is defined as follows: X¯ = {x ∈ X : ∃P ∈ P , Px ∈ X+}.
The following inclusions hold: X+ ⊂ X¯ ⊂ X. In a finite setting, X¯ would be
the same as X. To see why this does not hold in an infinite setting, consider the
stream x = (1, 0, 0, . . . ). For any permutation pi, it must be that pi(1) < +∞ so
that any reordered stream has the form (0, 0, . . . , 0, 1, 0, . . . ). Hence, x cannot
be reordered to form a non-decreasing stream.
To characterize the set X¯, let for each τ ∈ N the function rτ : X→ N∪{∞}
be defined by rτ (x) = |{t ∈ N : xt < xτ}|+1 for all x ∈ X. Refer to rτ (x) as the
rank of generation τ , and say that generation τ ’s rank is finite if rτ (x) < +∞.
Lemma 1. An allocation x ∈ X belongs to X¯ if and only if, for all t ∈ N,
generation t’s rank is finite.
Proof. This is a restatement of Lemma 1 of Zuber and Asheim (2011).
Let the function ` : X → R+ be defined by `(x) = lim inft→+∞ xt for all
x ∈ X; note that this function is well-defined since streams in X are bounded.
By letting, for all x ∈ X, L(x) denote {t ∈ N : xt < `(x)}, we obtain the
following alternative characterization (Zuber and Asheim, 2011, Proposition 1):
(a) If an allocation x ∈ X satisfies |L(x)| < +∞, then x belongs to X¯ if and
only if xt ≤ `(x) for all t ∈ N.
(b) If an allocation x ∈ X satisfies |L(x)| = +∞, then x belongs to X¯ if and
only if xt < `(x) for all t ∈ N.
For x ∈ X¯, denote by x[ ] = (x[1], x[2], . . . , x[r], . . . ) the non-decreasing infinite
allocation which is a permutation of x; i.e., there exists P ∈ P such that x[ ] =
Px ∈ X+. Note that the permutation matrix P need not be unique (for instance,
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if for some t 6= t′, xt = xt′ , so that rt(x) = rt′(x)), but the resulting non-
decreasing allocation x[ ] is unique. In particular, it holds for all t ∈ N that
x[rt(x)] = xt. Likewise, for x ∈ X, denote by (x[1], . . . , x[|L(x)|]) the non-decreasing
finite allocation which is a permutation of the elements of x satisfying t ∈ L(x).
A social welfare relation (SWR) on a set X is a binary relation %, where for
any x,y ∈ X, x % y entails that the consumption stream x is deemed socially
at least as good as y. Let ∼ and  denote the symmetric and asymmetric
parts of %. An SWR %′ is a subrelation to SWR %′′ if for all x, y ∈ X, (a)
x ∼′ y⇒ x ∼′′ y and (b) x ′ y⇒ x ′′ y.
3 Axiomatic foundation
The difficulty of combining equal treatment of an infinite number of generations
with sensitivity to the interests of each of these generations has been the topic of
a prolific literature since the seminal contribution by Diamond (1965). Although
complete social preferences over infinite streams that combine equal treatment
with Paretian sensitivity exist (Svensson, 1980), they cannot be explicitly de-
scribed (Basu and Mitra, 2003; Zame, 2007; Lauwers, 2010).
In this section we show how this impossibility is overcome by requiring only
sensitivity to the interests of generations whose consumption has finite rank. In
subsection 3.1 we first introduce the Pareto axiom restricted to non-decreasing
streams together with other axioms used to characterize the leximin criterion
we propose. In subsection 3.2 this criterion is then formally defined and fully
characterized. In subsection 3.3 we discuss the properties of this criterion, in
particular, that it is sensitive (only) to the interests of generations whose con-
sumption has finite rank, and satisfies full procedural equity.
3.1 Axioms
Axiom O (Order) The SWR % is complete, reflexive and transitive on X.
An SWR satisfying axiom O is named a social welfare order (SWO).
Axiom M (Monotonicity) For any x, y ∈ X, if x > y, then x % y.
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Axiom M is implied by the strong Pareto principle.
We then consider an axiom requiring sensitivity to the interests of each gen-
eration when comparing non-decreasing streams.
Axiom RSP (Restricted Strong Pareto)For any x, y ∈ X+, if x > y, then x  y.
We now turn to an axiom combining Koopmans’ (1960) stationarity axiom
(Postulate 4) with his separability Postulate 3b (the axiom requiring that the
evaluation of two streams with the same present consumption not depend on
what that level of consumption is).
Axiom IF (Independent Future) For any x, y ∈ X and z ∈ R+, (z,x) % (z,y)
if and only if x % y.
If we extended our framework to also include comparisons at future times, then
axiom IF would imply time consistency provided the SWR % is time invariant.
Next, we state two continuity axioms which have been weakened by restrict-
ing the domains of the streams x1,x2, . . . ,xk, . . . and the domain of the stream x
to which this sequence converges to. Note that their use of the product topology
is justified by means of prioritarianism for the worse-off because x is required to
belong to X+.
Axiom RC1 (Restricted Continuity 1 ) For any x ∈ X+ and y ∈ X, if a sequence
x1,x2, . . . ,xk, . . . of allocations in X is such that limk→∞
∑
t∈N |xkt − xt|2−t = 0
and, for each k ∈ N, xkt ∈ {xt, yt} for all t ∈ N and xk % y (resp. xk - y), then
x % y (resp. x - y).
Axiom RC2 (Restricted Continuity 2 ) For any x ∈ X+ and y ∈ X, if a sequence
x1,x2, . . . ,xk, . . . of allocations in X is such that limk→∞
∑
t∈N |xkt − xt|2−t = 0
and, for each k ∈ N, there exists Pk ∈ P satisfying xk ≥ Pky (resp. xk ≤ Pky),
then x % y (resp. x - y).
Imposed continuity axioms must be restricted since, of course, an unrestricted
continuity axiom is not compatible with leximin. Axiom RC1 is clearly weaker
than unrestricted continuity (as only binary consumption choices are consid-
ered), while axiom RC2 is weaker than unrestricted continuity if % satisfies
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axioms M and SA since then xk ≥ Pky (resp. xk ≤ Pky) implies xk % y (resp.
xk - y) while the converse implication does not hold.
Finally, we state the strong axiom of procedural equity, requiring social in-
difference with respect to all permutation matrices P ∈ P .
Axiom SA (Strong Anonymity) For any P ∈ P and x ∈ X, x ∼ Px.
While the axiom of finite anonymity (i.e., anonymity in its weaker form, involv-
ing only finite permutations) is too weak – as it “only guarantees impartiality
for a (negligibly) small part of the utility stream” (Van Liedekerke and Lauwers,
1997, p. 165) – axiom SA might be too strong – as it produces hard-to-defend
indifferences between streams (Lauwers, 2011). We provide a discussion of the
appropriateness of axiom SA in subsection 3.3.
3.2 Characterization
In this subsection we completely characterize the class of SWOs satisfying ax-
ioms O, M, RSP, IF, RC1, RC2 and SA. As a first step, we do so within
the restricted domain X¯ of streams that can be reordered into non-decreasing
streams.
Definition 1 Strongly anonymous leximin SWO. An SWR %LP on X¯ is a strongly
anonymous leximin SWO (SAL SWO) if, for any x, y ∈ X¯, x ∼LP y if and only
if x[ ] = y[ ] and x LP y if and only if there exists R ∈ N such that x[r] = y[r] for
all r ∈ {1, . . . , R− 1} and x[R] > y[R].
Note that%LP satisfies completeness and reflexivity on X¯ as, for any x, y ∈ X¯,
x[ ] = y[ ] or there exists R ∈ N such that x[r] = y[r] for all r ∈ {1, . . . , R − 1}
and x[R] 6= y[R]. Showing that %LP satisfies transitivity on X¯ is equally straight-
forward. Hence, %LP is an order on X¯.
Proposition 1. If an SWR % on X¯ satisfies axioms O, RSP, IF, RC1 and
SA, then it is an SAL SWO.
The proof of this result is based on the following intuition: Axiom RC1,
with its use of the product topology combined with the requirement that the
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stream x to which x1,x2, . . . ,xk, . . . converges belong to X+, induces priority
for a worse off generation. Axioms IF and SA imply that the priority for the
worse off generation in conflicts between two generations cannot depend on the
number of generations that have consumption levels in-between. This has as
consequence that the priority must be extreme.
Proof of Proposition 1. Assume that x, y ∈ X¯ and that an SWR % on X¯ satis-
fies axioms O, RSP, IF, RC1 and SA. Since %LP is complete, it is sufficient to
show that x ∼LP y implies x ∼ y and x LP y implies x  y.
x ∼LP y implies x ∼ y. Assume x ∼LP y. By Definition 1, x[ ] = y[ ]. By O
and SA, x ∼ y.
x LP y implies x  y. Assume x LP y. By Definition 1, there exists R ∈ N
such that x[r] = y[r] for all r ∈ {1, . . . , R − 1} and x[R] > y[R]. Construct x˜,
y˜ ∈ X+ as follows: (i) x[t] = x˜t = y˜t = y[t] for t ∈ {1, . . . , R − 1}, (ii) x[R] =
x˜R > y˜R = y[R], and (iii) x˜t = x˜ = infr>R x[r] and y˜t = y˜ = supr>R y[r] for t > R.
It suffices to show x˜  y˜ as this implies x  y by axioms O, RSP and SA.
In the case where x˜ ≥ y˜, then x˜  y˜ follows directly from axiom RSP.
Hence, assume that x˜ < y˜ and suppose x˜ - y˜. Consider the following sequence
y˜1, y˜2, . . . , y˜k, . . . of allocations in X:
y˜kt =
x˜ if t = R + 1, . . . R + k ,y˜t otherwise.
It follows from repeated application of axioms IF and SA that, for each k ∈ N,
x˜ - y˜k. This in turn, by axiom RC1, implies that x˜ - y˜∞ where
y˜∞t =
x˜ if t > R ,y˜t otherwise,
since y˜∞ ∈ X+, limk→∞
∑
t∈N |y˜kt − y˜∞t |2−t = 0, and for each k ∈ N, y˜kt ∈ {y˜t, x˜t}
for all t ∈ N. However, this contradicts that, by axiom RSP, x˜  y˜∞. Hence,
x˜  y˜ also in the case where x˜ < y˜.
A second step is to extend the SAL SWO to the entire domain X without
8
conflict with any of the axioms O, M, RSP, IF, RC1, RC2 and SA. To do so,
define, for any x ∈ X, x¯ as follows:{
x¯t = min{xt, `(x)} for all t ∈ N if |L(x)| < +∞
x¯ is the subsequence of x consisting of all xt with t ∈ L(x) if |L(x)| = +∞
Lemma 1 implies that, by construction, x¯ belongs to X¯; therefore x¯[ ] is well-
defined.
Definition 2 Extended strongly anonymous leximin SWO. An SWR %LP on X
is an extended strongly anonymous leximin SWO (ESAL SWO) if, for any x,
y ∈ X, x ∼LP y if and only if x¯[ ] = y¯[ ] and x LP y if and only if there exists
R ∈ N such that x¯[r] = y¯[r] for all r ∈ {1, . . . , R− 1} and x¯[R] > y¯[R].
Proposition 2. The ESAL SWO %LP on X satisfies axioms O, M, RSP, IF,
RC1, RC2 and SA.
Proof. The ESAL SWO satisfies axiom O. This follows from the facts that SAL
SWO is an order and x¯[ ] is well-defined for any x ∈ X.
The ESAL SWO satisfies axiom M. Assume x > y so that `(x) ≥ `(y).
Suppose x ≺LP y, implying that there exists R ∈ N such that x¯[r] = y¯[r] for all
r ∈ {1, . . . , R− 1} and x¯[R] < y¯[R] ≤ `(y) ≤ `(x). Hence,
|{t ∈ N : xt < y¯[R]}| ≥ R > R− 1 = |{t ∈ N : yt < y¯[R]}| .
However, as x > y, {t ∈ N : xt < y¯[R]} ⊆ {t ∈ N : yt < y¯[R]}, leading to a
contradiction. Hence, by axiom O, x %LP y.
The ESAL SWO satisfies axiom RSP. The ESAL SWO corresponds to the
SAL SWO on X¯ ⊇ X+, and the SAL SWO satisfies axiom RSP.
The ESAL SWO satisfies axiom IF. Consider any x, y ∈ X and z ∈ R+, and
write x′ = (z,x) and y′ = (z,y). Suppose x ≺LP y, so that there exists R ∈ N
such that x¯[r] = y¯[r] for all r ∈ {1, . . . , R − 1} and x¯[R] < y¯[R]. If z ≤ x¯R, then
x¯′[r] = y¯
′
[r] for all r ∈ {1, . . . , R} and x¯′[R+1] < y¯′[R+1]. If z > x¯R, then x¯′[r] = y¯′[r]
for all r ∈ {1, . . . , R−1} and x¯′[R] < min{z, y¯[R]} = y¯′[R]. In either case, x′ ≺LP y′,
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establishing by axiom O that (z,x) %LP (z,y) implies x %LP y. The converse
follows likewise by showing that (z,x) ≺LP (z,y) implies x ≺LP y.
The ESAL SWO satisfies axiom RC1. Consider any x ∈ X+ and y ∈ X. Let
the sequence x1,x2, . . . ,xk, . . . of allocations in X be such that, for each k ∈ N,
xkt ∈ {xt, yt} for all t ∈ N and xk %LP y. Suppose x ≺LP y, so that there exists
R ∈ N such that xr = y¯[r] for all r ∈ {1, . . . , R − 1} and xR < y¯[R]. Since y¯[R] ≤
`(y), |{t ∈ N : yt < y¯[R]}| = R − 1, implying since, for each k ∈ N, xkt ∈ {xt, yt}
for all t ∈ N and xk %LP y that limk→∞
∑
t∈N |xkt − xt|2−t ≥ |y¯R − xR|2−R > 0.
Hence, if limk→∞
∑
t∈N |xkt − xt|2−t = 0, then x %LP y, by axiom O. Likewise if,
for each k ∈ N, xkt ∈ {xt, yt} for all t ∈ N and xk -LP y.
The ESAL SWO satisfies axiom RC2. Consider any x ∈ X+ and y ∈ X. Let
the sequence x1,x2, . . . ,xk, . . . of allocations in X be such that, for each k ∈ N,
there exists Pk ∈ P satisfying xk ≥ Pky. Suppose x ≺LP y, so that there exists
R ∈ N such that xr = y¯[r] for all r ∈ {1, . . . , R − 1} and xR < y¯[R]. Since y¯[R] ≤
`(y), |{t ∈ N : yt < y¯[R]}| = R − 1, implying since, for each k ∈ N, there exists
Pk ∈ P satisfying xk ≥ Pky that limk→∞
∑
t∈N |xkt − xt|2−t ≥ |y¯R − xR|2−R > 0.
Hence, if limk→∞
∑
t∈N |xkt − xt|2−t = 0, then x %LP y, by axiom O. Likewise if
there exists Pk ∈ P satisfying xk ≤ Pky.
The ESAL SWO satisfies axiom SA. For any x ∈ X, if there exists P ∈ P
such that y = Px, then `(y) = `(x) (as infinite permutations preserve lim inf)
so that x¯[ ] = y¯[ ] and x ∼LP y.
A third step is to show that the ESAL SWO is the only SWR satisfying
axioms O, M, RSP, IF, RC1, RC2 and SA on the full domain X. This follows
from the following proposition and is stated as the paper’s main theorem.
Proposition 3. If an SWO % on X satisfies axioms O, M, RC2 and SA,
then x¯ ∼ x for any x ∈ X.
Proof. Let s(x) denote supt∈N xt for any x ∈ X.
Case 1: |L(x)| < +∞. Since x¯ ≤ x, it follows that x¯ - x by axioms O and
M. To show x¯ % x, construct, for each k ∈ N, x¯k as follows:
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x¯kt =

x¯[t] if t ≤ |L(x)|
`(x) + 1
k
(
s(x)− `(x)) if |L(x)|+ 1 ≤ t ≤ |L(x)|+ k
s(x) if t > |L(x)|+ k .
By Zuber and Asheim (2011, proof of Lemma 3), there exists, for each k ∈ N,
Pk ∈ P such that x¯k ≥ Pkx. Since∑
t∈N
|x¯kt − x¯[t]|2−t =
(
1
k
(1− 2−k) + 2−k)(s(x)− `(x))2−|L(x)| ,
we have that x¯[ ] % x by axiom RC2, and x¯ % x by axioms O and SA.
Case 2: |L(x)| = +∞. Construct, for each k ∈ N, x¯k as follows:
x¯kt =
x¯[t] if t ≤ ks(x) if t > k .
Since there exists, for each k ∈ N, Pk ∈ P such that x¯k ≥ Pkx and, furthermore,
limk→∞
∑
t∈N |x¯kt − x¯[t]|2−t = 0, we have that x¯[ ] % x by axiom RC2, and x¯ % x
by axioms O and SA. Construct, for each k ∈ N, yk as follows:
ykt =
x¯[t] if t ≤ kx¯[k] if t > k .
Since there exists, for each k ∈ N, Pk ∈ P such that yk ≤ Pkx and, furthermore,
limk→∞
∑
t∈N |ykt − x¯[t]|2−t = 0, we have that x¯[ ] - x by axiom RC2, and x¯ - x
by axioms O and SA. Hence, x¯ ∼ x also in this case.
Theorem 1. Consider an SWR % on X. The following two statements are
equivalent.
(1) % satisfies axioms O, M, RSP, IF, RC1, RC2 and SA.
(2) % is an ESAL SWO.
Proof. (1) implies (2). This follows from Propositions 1 and 3. (2) implies (1).
This follows from Proposition 2.
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3.3 Properties
We have alluded to the property that the ESAL SWO is sensitive to the interests
of generations at finite rank. The following is a formal statement of this property.
Axiom SFR (Sensitivity to Finitely Ranked generations) For any x, y ∈ X, if
x > y with xτ > yτ for some τ ∈ N satisfying rτ (x), rτ (y) < +∞, then x  y.
Axiom SFR implies axiom RSP as all generations have finite rank in a non-
decreasing stream. Since all generations along a stream in X¯ have finite rank
(by Lemma 1), it even implies that x  y whenever x, y ∈ X¯ satisfy x > y.
Extreme priority of the worse off generation in conflicts between two gener-
ations is usually captured by the following axiom.
Axiom HE (Hammond Equity) For any x, y ∈ X, if there exist τ , τ ′ ∈ N such
that yτ < xτ < xτ ′ < yτ ′ and yt = xt for all t 6= τ , τ ′, then x % y.
The following result shows that the ESAL SWO satisfies these two axioms.
Proposition 4. The ESAL SWO %LP on X satisfies axioms SFR and HE.
Proof. The ESAL SWO satisfies axiom SFR. Consider x and y as in the def-
inition of axiom SFR. The assumption that rτ (x), rτ (y) < +∞ implies that
xτ ≤ `(x) and yτ ≤ `(y). Since x > y, we have that `(x) ≥ `(y), and by the
fact that the ESAL SWO satisfies axiom M, we know that x %LP y.
Suppose x ∼LP x so that x¯[ ] = y¯[ ] by the definition of the ESAL SWO. Since
limr→∞ x¯[r] = `(x) and limr→∞ y¯[r] = `(y), the case where `(x) > `(y) would
contradict x¯[ ] = y¯[ ]. Hence, consider the remaining case where yτ <xτ ≤ `(x) =
`(y). Then there exists R ∈ N such that
|{t ∈ N : xt ≤ yτ}| < R = |{t ∈ N : yt ≤ yτ}| .
Therefore, x[R] > yτ = y[R], contradicting that x¯[ ] = y¯[ ] also in this case.
Thus, since x %LP x and x LP x, it follows that x LP x.
The ESAL SWO satisfies axiom HE. Consider x and y as in the definition of
axiom HE. (a) If `(x) = `(y) ≤ yτ , then x¯ = y¯ so that x ∼LP y by the definition
of the ESAL SWO. (b) If `(x) = `(y) > yτ , let R be the largest integer r such
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that y¯[r] = yτ . By the definitions of x¯[ ] and y¯[ ], it holds that x¯[r] = y¯[r] for
all r ∈ {1, . . . , R − 1} and x¯[R] > y¯[R] so that x LP y. Hence, in either case,
x %LP x.
Since the ESAL SWO satisfies axiom SFR, this criterion is able to strictly
rank some pairs of streams which are deemed equally good by maximin. To
exemplify, consider starting with an egalitarian stream where all generations
have the same consumption level y, and then compare this stream to the stream
obtained by lifting a subsetN of the generations up to a higher consumption level
x. By maximin the resulting stream is equally good as the original egalitarian
stream even if only one generation remains at y. In contrast, by the ESAL
SWO the new stream is strictly better as long as N is cofinite, so that the set
of generations remaining at y is finite.
Such increased sensitivity may change the set of optimal streams in economic
models. In particular, Cairns and Tian (2010, Section 4) claim that, for some
set of initial conditions, there are efficient maximin streams in the Brander-
Taylor model of the Easter Island (Brander and Taylor, 1998) where individual
wellbeing is non-decreasing and strictly increasing for a finite subinterval of
time. For such initial conditions, keeping individual wellbeing constant at its
initial maximin level is optimal (although not time-consistent) according to the
maximin criterion, but not optimal according to the ESAL SWO.
As the ESAL SWO is not sensitive to the interests of generations at infi-
nite rank, Theorem 1 demonstrates that sensitivity cannot be extended beyond
finitely ranked generations under axioms O, M, RSP, IF, RC1, RC2 and SA.
Hence, under these axioms the stream obtained by lifting a subset N of the
generations up to a higher consumption level x is equally good as the original
egalitarian stream if there are infinitely many generations remaining at y.
• On the one hand, given that the ESAL SWO satisfies the extreme form of
prioritarianism that axiom HE captures, one may argue that it is reason-
able that the criterion not be sensitive to the interests of generations at
infinite rank. Because if generation t is at infinite rank, there are infinitely
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many generations that are worse off. And by axiom HE, in conflicts be-
tween two generations, the one with the lower rank should have priority.
• On the other hand, the infinite number of generations remaining at y might
appear further and further apart so that the asymptotic density of the set
of times t with xt = y equals zero. In the context of an ordered set like
time, this might be considered problematic.
This last observation is closely related to an argument set forward by Lauwers
(2011), namely that the strong axiom of anonymity, SA, might be too strong
when applied in the setting of an infinite and ordered set like time. In particular,
consider two streams, x and y, composed only of x and y (with x > y as above),
where lim inft→+∞ x = lim inft→+∞ y = y and lim supt→+∞ x = lim supt→+∞ x =
x. However, in stream x, the ys appear further and further apart, so that the
asymptotic density of the set of positions t with xt = y equals 0, while in stream
y, the xs appear further and further apart, so that the asymptotic density of
the set of positions t with xt = y equals 1. By axiom SA, these streams are
equally good, which might considered equally problematic.
In fact, axiom SA is even in conflict with the weak Pareto principle whereby
one stream is preferred to another stream if the former has higher consumption
than the latter at all times. This is demonstrated by the following adaptation
of Fleurbaey and Michel’s (2003) proof of their Theorem 1 to a setting where
streams are bounded: Consider
x =
(
1
3
, 2
3
, 1
4
, 3
4
, . . . , 1
k+2
, k+1
k+2
, . . .
)
y =
(
1
4
, 1
3
, 1
5
, 2
3
, . . . , 1
k+3
, k
k+1
, . . .
)
,
where by axiom SA x is indifferent to y even though xt > yt for all t ∈ N.
Indeed, the ESAL SWO does not satisfy the weak Pareto principle (since x ∼LP y
whenever x and y satisfy xt > yt ≥ `(y) = `(x) for all t ∈ N), and by the above
demonstration this feature is necessary for an SWO satisfying axiom SA.
It must however be noticed that this conflict arises even between the weak
Pareto principle and the axiom of finite anonymity. On the domain [0, 1]N, Zame
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shows that any explicitly described complete, reflexive and transitive preferences
cannot be proved to satisfy the weak Pareto principle and the axiom of finite
anonymity (Zame, 2007, Th. 4). This result applies to our larger domain.
The present discussion illustrates the difficult nature of the dilemma posed
by the Lauwers-Zame impossibility result. By restricting sensitivity to finitely
ranked generations we have through the ESAL SWO been able to propose an
explicitly described complete, reflexive and transitive SWR that satisfies pro-
cedural equity, not only in the sense of finite anonymity, but even in the form
of axiom SA. It is an open and interesting question whether there exist ver-
sions of leximin where sensitivity is pushed beyond axiom SFR while retaining
completeness and an appropriate form of procedural equity.
4 Limit of rank-discounted utilitarianism
The extended rank-discounted utilitarian criterion is introduced and character-
ized by Zuber and Asheim (2011). This criterion coincides with discounted utili-
tarianism on the set of non-decreasing consumption streams. Utility discounting
is then justified as an expression of inequality aversion when future generations
are better off. However, and contrary to the discounted utilitarian approach,
extended rank-discounted utilitarianism also satisfies procedural equity: two
intergenerational consumption streams that are identical up to a permutation
are deemed equally good. On streams that are not non-decreasing, discounting
becomes the mere expression of intergenerational inequality aversion.
Definition 3 Extended Rank-Discounted Utilitarian SWO. An SWR on X is an
Extended Rank-Discounted Utilitarian SWO (ERDU SWO) if it is represented
by an SWF W : X→ R defined by:
W (x) = u(`(x)) + (1− β)
∑|L(x)|
r=1
βr−1
(
u(x[r])− u(`(x))
)
, (1)
where 0 < β < 1 is a real number and the function u is continuous and increasing.
Write %β,u for the ERDU SWO characterized by β and u. The following
result establishes that, for any increasing and continuous function u, the ESAL
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SWO %LP is the limit of the ERDU SWO %β,u as β — the utility discount factor
according to rank — approaches 0.
Proposition 5. For any x, y ∈ X and any continuous and increasing function
u, x %LP y if and only if there exists β¯ ∈ (0, 1) such that x %β,u y for all
β ∈ (0, β¯).
Proof. Assume that x, y ∈ X¯, and that u is a continuous and increasing function.
Since %LP is complete, it is sufficient to show that x ∼LP y implies the existence
of β¯ ∈ (0, 1) such that x ∼β,u y for all β ∈ (0, β¯), and that x LP y implies the
existence of β¯ ∈ (0, 1) such that x β,u y for all β ∈ (0, β¯).
x ∼LP y implies the existence of β¯ ∈ (0, 1) such that x ∼β,u y for all β ∈
(0, β¯). By Definition 2, x¯[ ] = y¯[ ]. By Definition 3, x ∼β,u y for all β ∈ (0, 1).
x LP y implies the existence of β¯ ∈ (0, 1) such that x β,u y for all β ∈
(0, β¯). By Definition 2, there exists R ∈ N such that x¯[r] = y¯[r] for all r ∈
{1, . . . , R − 1} and x¯[R] > y¯[R]. Construct x˜, y˜ ∈ X+ as follows: (i) x¯[t] =
x˜t = y˜t = y¯[t] for t ∈ {1, . . . , R − 1}, (ii) x¯[R] = x˜R > y˜R = y¯[R], and (iii)
x˜t = x˜ = infr>R x¯[r] and y˜t = y˜ = supr>T y¯[r] for t > T . It suffices to show
x˜ β,u y˜ as this implies x  y because %LP satisfies axioms O, M and SA.
In the case where x˜ ≥ y˜, then x˜ β,u y˜ for all β ∈ (0, 1) follows directly
because %LP satisfies axiom RSP. Hence, assume that x˜ < y˜, and define β¯ by
(1− β¯)u(x˜R) + β¯u(x˜) = (1− β¯)u(y˜R) + β¯u(y˜) .
Then, by (1), x˜ ∼β¯,u y˜, and x˜ β,u y˜ for all β ∈ (0, β¯).
Proposition 5 bears some similarities to Basu and Mitra’s (2007) robustness
check for their utilitarian SWR (Basu and Mitra, 2007, p. 361).1 Their idea is
to start with the standard time-discounted utilitarian criterion and argue that
the violation of procedural equity that the criterion entails is ‘small’ when the
discount factor is close to one. They show that their utilitarian SWR orders
any two streams the same way as time-discounted utilitarian criteria exhibiting
appropriately ‘small’ violations of procedural equity.
1We thank Kohei Kamaga for making this observation.
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In Proposition 5, we start from the ERDU SWO rather than the time-dis-
counted utilitarian criterion, so that there is no violation of procedural equity,
and we look at the case where the discount factor is close to zero. This means
that we concentrate on cases where most priority is given to the poor. We show
that our leximin criterion orders any two streams the same way as ERDU criteria
exhibiting appropriately ‘large’ priority to the worst off.
5 Comparison with other extensions of leximin
In the recent literature on intertemporal social choice, leximin is usually defined
in the setting of infinite consumption streams by extending the definition of
leximin on the set of finite consumption streams to the infinite setting. To
consider this literature and its relation to the present definition of leximin, let
us reproduce the definition of leximin in the finite setting.
For this purpose, denote by xT the finite stream (x1, x2, . . . , xt, . . . , xT ) and
denote by x[T] = (x[1], x[2], . . . , x[r], . . . , x[T ]) the non-decreasing allocation which
is a permutation of xT; i.e., there exists P (T ) such that x[T] = P (T )xT is non-
decreasing. Then %LT is defined by, for any xT, yT ∈ RT+, xT ∼LT yT if and only
if x[T] = y[T] and xT LT yT if and only if there exists R ≤ T such that x[r] = y[r]
for all r ∈ {1, . . . , R− 1} and x[R] > y[R].
In the finite setting leximin satisfies both the strong Pareto principle and
anonymity. However, in the infinite setting, as pointed out by Van Liedek-
erke and Lauwers (1997), the strong Pareto principle is in conflict with strong
anonymity, i.e., axiom SA. Furthermore, Zame (2007) and Lauwers (2010)
demonstrate that SWOs satisfying strong Pareto cannot be explicitly described
even when finite anonymity (i.e., anonymity in its weaker form, involving only
finite permutations) is imposed. Hence, when extending leximin to infinite
streams in a manner that allows explicit description, one cannot keep both
axioms O and SA while insisting on the strong Pareto principle.
In the present paper, we have kept axioms O and SA and weakened the
strong Pareto principle, by requiring sensitivity only to generations at finite
rank. Other explicitly describable extensions of leximin to the infinite setting
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have all weakened axiom O. They can be divided in two parts depending on
whether completeness or transitivity is relaxed.
Most of these extensions relax completeness. This is in particular the case of
%L, under which streams are comparable only if they eventually coincide. The
SWR %L is defined as follows (cf. Asheim, d’Aspremont and Banerjee, 2010):
For any x, y ∈ X, x %L y if and only if there exists T ∈ N such that xT %LT yT
and x = xTy. This criterion does satisfy axiom SA, but fails the weak Pareto
principle even for constant streams dominating each other. Bossert, Sprumont
and Suzumura (2007) suggest %LF , under which streams are comparable only
if they eventually coincide or Pareto-dominates each other. The SWR %LF is
defined as follows: For any x, y ∈ X, x %LF y if and only if there exists T ∈ N
such that xT %LT yT and x ≥ xTy. This criterion satisfies the strong Pareto
principle and hence not axiom SA; rather, it satisfies finite anonymity.
Various other contributions show how comparability can be increased further
by imposing anonymity involving fixed-step permutations (Lauwers, 1997; Ka-
maga and Kojima, 2009), different kinds of overtaking or catching-up (Asheim
and Tungodden, 2004; Asheim, d’Aspremont and Banerjee, 2010), or both (As-
heim and Banerjee, 2010; Kamaga and Kojima, 2010). However, since these are
explicitly described SWRs satisfying reflexivity, transitivity, finite anonymity
and the strong Pareto principle, it follows from the results of Zame (2007) and
Lauwers (2010) that they are not complete.
Given the incompleteness of the leximin criteria of the previous paragraph,
one may ask whether they are subrelations to the complete leximin criterion %LP .
This is not case since (1, 0, 0, 0, . . . ) is deemed socially better than (0, 0, 0, 0, . . . )
according to all of these incomplete criteria while they are equally good according
to %LP : (1, 0, 0, 0, . . . ) ∼LP (0, 0, 0, 0, . . . ).
In fact, there exist x, y ∈ X such that x LP y, while x ≺ y for any
of different overtaking or catching-up leximin criteria % considered by Asheim
and Tungodden (2004), Kamaga and Kojima (2010), Asheim, d’Aspremont and
Banerjee (2010) and Asheim and Banerjee (2010). Since the time-invariant
overtaking leximin criterion %LI of Asheim, d’Aspremont and Banerjee (2010)
is a subrelation to all the other overtaking or catching-up leximin criteria, this
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result is established through the following proposition.
Proposition 6. There exist x, y ∈ X such that x LP y and x ≺LI y.
To avoid the additional notation needed to define the time-invariant over-
taking leximin criterion %LI , we state the following characterization.
Lemma 2. The following two statements are equivalent.
(1) x %LI y,
(2) For any P ∈ P, there exists T ∈ N such that (Px)T %LT (Py)T,
Proof. (1) implies (2). Assume that (1) is true. As any P ∈ P maps a finite
subset of N into another finite subset of N, it follows directly from Asheim,
d’Aspremont and Banerjee (2010, Definition 4) that, for any P ∈ P , there exists
T ∈ N such that (Px)T %LT (Py)T.
(2) implies (1). Suppose that (1) is not true. Then, by Asheim, d’Aspremont
and Banerjee (2010, the proof of Proposition 7), there exists P ∈ P such that
(Px)T ≺LT (Py)T for all T ∈ N. This contradicts (2).
Proof of Proposition 6. Let x = (0, 1, 1, . . . , 1, . . . ) and y = (1, 1
2
, 1
3
, . . . , 1
n
, . . . ).
Then x¯[1] = 0 = y¯[1] and x¯[2] = 1 > 0 = y¯[2] so that x LP y. We must show that
x ≺LI y; i.e., x -LI y, but not x %LI y.
x -LI y is true. Consider any P ∈ P . Then there exists τ ∈ N such that
xpi = (xpi(1), xpi(2), . . . ) = Px satisfies pi(τ) = 1 and xpi(τ) = 0. Choose T ≥ τ .
Then (Px)T -LT (Py)T. By Lemma 2, this implies x -LI y.
x %LI y is not true. By Lemma 2, it suffices to show the existence of P ∈ P
such that (Px)T ≺LT (Py)T for all T ∈ N. Since xT ≺LT yT for all T ∈ N, this is
obtained by setting P equal to the identity matrix.
In his Theorem 5, Sakai (2010) considers variants of the leximin criteria
satisfying completeness and the strong Pareto principle while failing transitiv-
ity. When comparing complete criteria, one SWR is a subrelation to another
SWR if and only if they are identical. The leximin variants considered by Sakai
(2010) are all different from %LP as they, by the strong Pareto principle, deem
(1, 0, 0, 0, . . . ) to be socially better than (0, 0, 0, 0, . . . ). Furthermore, it cannot
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be shown that x LP y implies x  y for the whole range of complete but
intransitive leximin criteria % considered by Sakai (2010).
6 Concluding remarks
In this paper we have shown that the problem of combining completeness and
procedural equity is resolved if one does not insist on sensitivity to the interests of
generations whose consumption has infinite rank. In fact, then one can explicitly
define a version of leximin over infinite consumption streams that is complete,
reflexive and transitive, while satisfying the strong form of procedural equity that
axiom SA entails. Provided that one adopts the extreme form of prioritarianism
that leximin represents, perhaps it is reasonable not to care about generations
who are better off than an infinite number of other generations.
It is important to note that the use of the product topology in axioms RC1
and RC2 does not reflect impatience, but priority for the worse-off, as the stream
being approached is restricted to be non-decreasing. This entails that such
prioritarianism need not be introduced by invoking axiom HE, which usually
is employed to ensuree extreme priority of the worse off generation in conflicts
between two generations.
In the axiomatic foundations for discounted utilitarianism and extended
rank-discounted utilitarianism, impatience (in the former case) and priority for
the worse-off (in the latter case) are not introduced through the continuity ax-
iom, as the uniform topology is used. Rather, impatience and priority for the
worse-off respectively follow when such continuity is combined with versions of
Koopmans’ stationarity and separability conditions.
We have already shown that the ESAL SWO satisfies stationarity and sep-
arable future on the set of all streams (cf. axiom IF of Section 3.1), and it is
straightforward to show that the criterion satisfies separable present on the set of
non-decreasing streams. It is an open question whether introducing axiom HE,
while weakening axioms RC1 and RC2 to versions where the uniform topology
is used, is sufficient to characterize the ESAL SWO in view of these separability
properties.
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